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We exploit the quasi-random assignment of borrowers to loan officers using data from a large 
Albanian lender to show that own-gender preferences affect both credit supply and demand. 
Borrowers matched to officers of the opposite gender are less likely to return for a second 
loan. The effect is larger when officers have little prior exposure to borrowers of the other 
gender and when they have more discretion to act on their gender beliefs, as proxied by 
financial market competition and branch size. We examine one channel of influence, loan 
conditionality. Borrowers assigned to opposite-sex officers pay higher interest rates and 
receive lower loan amounts, but do not experience higher arrears. Together our results imply 
that own-gender preferences in the credit market can have substantial welfare effects. 
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Group identity in the form of family, ethnicity, and gender is a powerful predictor of social 
preferences (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Chen and Li, 2009; Benjamin et al., 2010). In 
particular, people generally favor in-group over out-group members. Favoritism based on, for 
example, gender identity can lead to inefficient transactions and/or lost opportunities. 
However, gender similarity may also entail trust, reciprocity, and efficiency due to shared 
norms and understandings. In this paper, we examine one important form of group identity, 
gender, and the consequences of own-gender preferences for outcomes in the credit market. 
Credit transactions rely heavily on the interaction between bank officers and 
borrowers. Microcredit is a case in point, with most clients being small and opaque, leaving 
the lending decision at the judgment of the loan officer. 1
Using a large dataset of loan transactions from a commercial microlender in Albania, 
we investigate whether the officer-borrower gender match influences the likelihood that 
borrowers return to the lender for additional credit. To understand if important officer 
attributes interact with gender identity, we also examine if prior exposure to opposite-sex 
borrowers and officers’ ability to act on their gender beliefs affect demand for more credit. In 
addition, we explore a possible channel that may explain changes in demand, loan 
conditionality, by studying the impact of the officer-borrower gender assignment on interest 
rates and approved loan amounts. Finally, the analysis allows us to test if the bias is taste 
based or related to lack of experience and whether it leads to more efficient loan transactions. 
 If gender shapes business operations 
we need to understand how key determinants of officer behavior, such as human capital and 
officers’ discretion to act on their beliefs, interact with gender. For example, how does prior 
experience with opposite-sex borrowers affect performance and do officers behave differently 
if they are more scrutinized? In addition, officers’ decisions may not only impact loan 
conditionality but also subsequent demand for credit. Recent work shows that poor borrowers 
are sensitive to small changes in interest rates (Karlan and Zinman, 2008). If a gender bias in 
the relationship between officers and borrowers results in higher interest rates or smaller loan 
amounts, this can have negative repercussions not only for access to and cost of credit, but 
also for take up of loans by poor borrowers. 
                                                 
1 If officers and borrowers share gender identity, this could improve efficiency through a better understanding of 
the clients’ particular circumstances. For example, female loan officers may better appreciate the ability of 
female entrepreneurs in terms of completing their project and/or repaying the debt. Conversely, a gender bias can 
also generate unfair loan conditionality. 
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Estimating the effect of own-gender preferences presents two main challenges. First, if 
male or female borrowers with certain characteristics are more likely to be assigned to the 
same or opposite-sex loan officers, the true effect of loan officer gender would be biased. 
Second, if unobserved borrower traits are correlated with borrower gender, and if these can be 
observed by the loan officers but not by the researchers, it is not clear whether a significant 
coefficient on gender is due to a loan officer bias or the unobservable traits. 
We address these issues by exploiting a quasi-random component of the institutional 
setting: the fact that first-time borrowers are arbitrarily assigned to their respective loan 
officer, with the sector of activity and year of application being the only factors driving the 
match with a specific officer. Conditional on sector and year, the random assignment of 
borrowers to officers ensures that unobservable borrower characteristics are the same across 
all officers, regardless of officer gender. In particular, we compare the difference in credit 
market outcomes for male and female borrowers obtaining loans from male loan officers to 
the difference between male and female borrowers obtaining loans from female loan officers. 
We find that the random assignment of first-time borrowers to opposite-sex loan 
officers has a significant impact on demand for credit. Borrowers matched with officers of the 
opposite gender are 11 percent less likely to apply for a second loan with the lender. To 
examine if gender-specific human capital traits matter, we explore the fact that our setting 
generates experimental variation in officers’ experience with first-time borrowers of the 
opposite sex. We show that the effect originates with borrowers whose officers have below-
median experience of the other gender. This indicates that officers learn about the other 
gender through professional experience and suggests that the bias does not stem from pure 
prejudice. 
To investigate if officers’ degree of discretion to act on their gender preferences is 
important, we use variation in financial market competition and in the number of officers 
employed in a given branch across bank branches and over time. The idea is as follows. In 
instances when it becomes costly for officers to express their gender beliefs, the incentives 
will be stronger to suppress the bias. 2
                                                 
2 The reasoning resembles the argument developed in Parsons et al. (2011), who show that an own-race bias 
associated with baseball referees is stronger in situations where it is less likely that the bias is discovered, in their 
context, in baseball arenas with cameras that document the decisions taken by the referees. 
 More competition offers borrowers better outside 
options inducing them to leave the bank if they are biased against. This lowers profits and 
prompts the lender to monitor loan officers more carefully to detect mistreatment of their 
clients. Along the same lines, it may be easier to replace a given officer in large branches with 
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many employees, leaving officers less discretion of indulging their own-gender preferences. 
The data confirm these predictions: the effect of the gender mismatch on credit demand is 
stronger in areas where the competition from other financial institutions is weaker or where 
the branch size is smaller. The analysis further shows that officers’ lack of opposite-sex 
experience and their degree of discretion are complements: the negative impact on demand for 
additional credit is most severe when officers have little experience with borrowers of the 
other gender and work in small branches or in areas with little outside competition. As an 
example, first-time borrowers are half as likely to apply for a second loan if they are matched 
with opposite-sex officers who have little prior experience of the other gender and work in 
smaller branches. 
Next we study differences in loan conditionality to explore one channel through which 
an own-gender bias can affect credit demand. First-time borrowers assigned to officers of the 
other gender pay, on average, 35 basis points higher interest rates compared to borrowers 
assigned to officers of the same gender. Again, these effects are more pronounced when 
officers have less opposite-sex experience and/or more discretion (weaker outside competition 
and smaller branches). Borrowers matched with officers with less exposure to the other 
gender and/or a large degree of discretion also receive between 4 to 24 percent lower loan 
amounts. 
Establishing that officer exposure to opposite-sex borrowers matters helps us rule out 
the existence of pure prejudice. However, it is not clear whether the bias we identify stems 
from a knowledge gap that leads officers to engage in more efficient transactions with own-
gender borrowers at first—or if it reflects an initial taste bias. To test for this, we use data on 
the likelihood that borrowers enter into arrears during the loan. If information asymmetries 
between officers and borrowers were important, the variation observed in interest rates or loan 
amounts should be reflected in different arrear outcomes. However, we find that arrears are 
independent of the officer-borrower gender assignment, suggesting that the bias is inefficient. 
Taken together, the results indicate that loan officers’ gender preferences can have 
non-trivial welfare effects for consumers (higher interest rates, smaller loan amounts, and 
lower demand) and providers of credit (lower long-run profits through diminished demand in 
the opposite-gender match). While our identification strategy bars us from making definite 
claims as to whether the bias stems from male or female loan officers favoring borrowers of 
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their own gender, or disfavoring those of the other gender, we provide some suggestive 
evidence in support of own-gender preferences.3
This paper speaks to several literatures. First, using experimental field data from a 
South African lender, where the interest rate offers were randomized, Karlan and Zinman 
(2008) show that clients are sensitive to interest rate changes, in particular to increases in 
price above the lender’s standard rates. In light of the interest rate differential identified in our 
paper, Karlan and Zinman’s finding suggests that a gender bias-induced price gap may be one 
important channel affecting credit demand. 
 
Second, while there are studies looking at own-race preferences in police behavior 
(Donohue and Levitt, 2001), in judicial sentencing (Welch et al., 1988) in the workplace 
(Stoll et al., 2004), and in sports (Price and Wolfers, 2010; Parsons et al., 2011), our paper is 
the first to gauge the existence of an own-gender bias in lending. There is also a broader 
literature documenting biases in credit markets, predominately using US data on either 
mortgage (Munnell et al., 1996; Berkovec et al., 1998; Ladd, 1998; Ross and Yinger, 2002; 
Han, 2004) or small business lending (Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo, 1998; Blanchflower et al., 
2003, Blanchard et al., 2008; Bellucci et al., 2010). More closely related, Fisman et al. (2012) 
report that shared ethnicity and religion between loan officers and borrowers in India improve 
credit allocation. Our paper differs from Fisman et al. by focusing on gender and on the 
combination of credit supply and demand, as well as in tracing the importance of prior 
exposure to opposite-sex borrowers. 
With the exception of Fisman et al., the above studies on a minority/gender bias in the 
credit market are based on correlations that do not control for all the characteristics that 
lenders observe when setting the contract terms. As a consequence, any measured differences 
in outcomes could be attributed to these factors unobserved by the researcher. Our data and 
setting provide an opportunity to test for a gender bias more rigorously. Moreover, previous 
work does not combine a supply and a demand-side analysis. 
Third, the paper relates to research documenting the impact of exposure to members of 
another group (Boisjoly et al., 2006; Beaman et al., 2009). While our data bar us from 
documenting changes in beliefs (unlike Boisjoly et al. and Beaman et al.), the results suggest 
that experience with the opposite gender has important economic implications. 
                                                 
3 In particular, running separate regressions at the loan officer level shows that the majority of male loan officers 
have a greater propensity to charge higher interest rates when lending to female borrowers than the majority of 
female loan officers and vice versa. Studying the demand for a second loan provides similar results. 
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Fourth, we connect to studies examining Becker’s (1957) hypothesis on the link 
between discrimination and competition showing that US bank branch deregulations tightened 
the wage gap in the financial industry between male and female workers (Black and Strahan, 
2001) and between white and black employees (Levine et al., 2011). We add to this literature 
by quantifying how financial market competition also reduces the impact of loan officers’ 
own-gender bias. 
Our findings inform empirical work examining poor peoples’ barriers to credit 
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2005; Karlan and Zinman, 2009). The setting of the current study, a for-
profit lender in Albania, extending loans under individual liability also fits the pattern of the 
second generation of microcredit (Armendáriz and Morduch, 2005; Karlan and Morduch, 
2009) which has evolved in the direction of more traditional retail and small business lending. 
Finally, the paper relates to a small literature studying the importance of loan officers 
in lending stressing long-term relationships, compensation schemes, officer rotation, and 
officer gender for loan performance (Hertzberg et al., 2010; Agarwal and Ben-David, 2011; 
Drexler and Schoar, 2011; Beck et al., 2012; Cole et al., 2012). We complement these studies 
by documenting the existence of an own-gender bias and in emphasizing the importance of 
loan officers’ prior exposure to opposite-sex borrowers. 
In the next section we provide institutional background information about our lender 
and the loan process, outline our methodology, and describe the data. Section three presents 
our findings on the relationship between own-gender preferences and demand for a second 
loan, while section four discusses results for the relationship between own-gender preferences 
and loan conditionality. Section five investigates whether the bias is efficient while section six 
explores if the bias is more pronounced for male or female officers. Section seven concludes. 
 
2 Data and identification strategy 
This section describes our data, provides background information about the lender, sample 
composition and descriptive statistics, and evidence on the validity of our identification 
strategy. 
 
2.1 Sources of data and institutional background information of the lender 
We rely on information from three sets of data. The loan-level data come from a large for-
profit commercial lender serving individuals and small- and medium-sized enterprises in 
Albania, the population and the financial market competition data were provided by the Bank 
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of Albania, and the data on household income is taken from the World Bank’s Living 
Standards Measurement Study (LSMS). 
The loan-transaction dataset includes nearly 7,300 loans given by a commercial lender 
over the period January 1996 to December 2006. The data also contain information on 279 
loan officers and cover all 21 branches of the bank. While the lender clearly focuses on the 
low-income and microenterprise segment, financial sustainability and therefore profitability is 
its primary goal. The financial market data include geographical information about the 
universe of Albania’s formally registered banks and their respective branches at the county 
level (prefekturë) for the period 2004-2006.4 The population statistics report the total number 
of people living in each county during the same period. Finally, the LSMS data on monthly 
wage payments draw on a series of nationally representative household surveys conducted in 
2002-2005 containing 1,797-3,638 households.5
Loan officers working for the lender have discretion on the rejection and approval of a 
loan application, as well as setting the interest rate and other loan conditions including the 
loan amount. The officer that originates a certain loan is also in charge of monitoring the 
repayment behavior of the borrower. If a loan is in arrears for more than 30 days, the officer 
intensifies monitoring, for instance, by calling or visiting the borrower to inquire about the 
reasons for repayment delay. When a loan is in arrears for more than 60 days, it is transferred 
to a special loan recovery department and, thus, a new loan officer. We can therefore follow 
the relationship between a borrower and an officer from approval over loan condition setting 
to its performance in terms of arrears up to 60 days, but not beyond that point as we lack 
information about the gender of the officers working in the loan recovery department. 
 
Assignment of borrowers to officers is based on the availability of officers in the 
respective branch when the borrower arrives. 6
                                                 
4 The information was obtained through correspondence with the Bank of Albania. 
 Specifically, first-time borrowers cannot 
choose a bank officer, barring an assignment based on any observable (for example, gender) 
or unobservable characteristic (for example, ability). Loan officers, however, may specialize 
in certain business sectors. For instance, it is more likely that a borrower working in the 
transportation business ends up with an officer with previous experience in handling 
borrowers from this sector. Since male and female officers or borrowers potentially specialize 
5 The household survey data are available at the World Bank’s Living Standard Measurement Study web page: 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTLSMS/0,,contentMDK:2136
9062~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3358997~isCURL:Y,00.html 
6 All loan officers work full time so it does not matter which day of the week a borrower arrives. 
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in certain sectors, this needs to be accounted for. Below we outline our identification strategy 
and how we account for the potential loan officer and borrower specialization. 
 
2.2 Sample composition and descriptive statistics 
When analyzing treatment differences we focus on the following four outcomes: (i) the 
likelihood that a borrower applies for a second loan with the lender; (ii) the annual interest 
rate paid; (iii) the loan amount approved; and (iv) the likelihood of going into arrears more 
than 30 days at any point during the loan cycle.7
In order to assess the gender bias across our four outcome variables, we work with two 
different samples. Specifically, we use the full sample of first-time borrowers as outlined 
above to study the relationship between gender assignment and loan conditionality: interest 
rate and loan amount approved (henceforth, the “loan conditionality sample”). To investigate 
the relationship between loan officer assignments and arrears on the first loan and demand for 
a second loan, we work with a smaller sample that accounts for the problem of right-
censoring, that is, the fact that borrowers might not come back to the bank because the 
maturity of their first loan lies beyond the end of our sample period. Hence, we compute the 
average time it takes until a second loan application of a first-time borrower is posted and end 
our sample period on December 31, 2006, less this average time of 198 days for the test. This 
reduces the sample size from 7,272 to 4,589 observations (henceforth, the “credit-demand 
sample”). 
 For our regression analysis, we restrict the 
data in two ways. First, we focus on first-time borrowers. By studying the first loan 
application submitted by each borrower, we assume that borrowers and loan officers had 
neither a previous business relationship nor any knowledge of each other. In the case of repeat 
borrowers, loan officers have historic information, which they can use when granting and 
monitoring the loan and deciding on loan conditionality. In addition, the fact that there is a 
gender bias in the demand for a second loan introduces selection in the sample of repeat 
borrowers. Focusing on the first loan by each loan applicant yields the cleanest test of a 
possible gender bias. Second, we drop loans with missing gender information. For that 
purpose, we exclude loans by borrowers classified as legal entities in the database as we lack 
information on borrower sex. Together, this yields a dataset of 7,272 loan transactions. 
                                                 
7 While we have information on rejected loan applications, almost all of the first-time applicants are granted a 
loan, yielding little meaningful variation to be exploited. When estimating cross-gender differences in the 
approval regression, however, we do not find any evidence of a gender bias. 
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Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the credit-demand sample, while 
Appendix Table A1 displays the same statistics for the (larger) loan-conditionality sample. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 1 shows that 66 percent of the first-time borrowers applied 
for a second loan and 5 percent of all loans fell into arrears for more than 30 days. 18 percent 
of the borrowers are female, while 62 percent of the loan officers are female.8 About 57 
percent of the loans in the credit-demand sample are managed by an opposite-sex officer.9 61 
percent among the male borrowers have a female officer and 36 percent of the female 
borrowers have a male officer. Loan officers are, on average, 25 years old, with male loan 
officers being two years older, which can be explained by compulsory military service for 
males in Albania. For most loan officers, this is the first formal job after college. 10
The descriptive statistics in the loan-conditionality sample, as reported in Appendix 
Table A1, show that the average interest rate is 14 percent, while the average loan size is 
2,752 USD. All other variables are very similar to the credit-demand sample. 
 On 
average, loan officers have processed 19 loans with borrowers of the opposite gender. 
Borrowers have a mean age of 41 with no significant difference between male and female 
borrowers or borrowers assigned to male or female loan officers. 87 percent of the borrowers 
are married and own assets of value 24,361 US Dollars (USD). Almost all loans require 
chattel collateral, while only 14 percent come with mortgage and 23 percent with a personal 
guarantee. 73 percent of all borrowers work in construction, while 12 percent work in 
production and 15 percent in transportation. 29 percent of the loans are used for fixed asset 
purchase, 37 percent for housing improvement, 24 percent for consumption, and 10 percent 
for working capital. 
 
2.3 Identification strategy 
To study the impact of the interaction between officer and borrower gender on borrower 
outcomes, we exploit the essentially random assignment of first-time borrowers to loan 
officers. In a framework analogous to a difference-in-differences estimation, we compare the 
difference in outcomes (demand for a second loan, interest rate, loan amount, and arrear 
probability) for male and female borrowers obtaining a loan from a male officer to the 
difference between male and female borrowers obtaining a loan from a female officer. 
                                                 
8 The relatively high share of female loan officers working for the bank is in line with labor market statistics 
published by the Statistical Institute of Albania (2007) and the recent Census, both showing that females are 
slightly overrepresented in financial institutions and in jobs similar to the job of a loan officer. 
9 This is simply 0.82×0.61 + 0.18×0.36. 
10 Personal communication with the lender. 
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The identifying assumption is that the difference between male and female borrowers 
screened and monitored by male loan officers is not significantly different from the difference 
between male and female borrowers screened and monitored by female loan officers, 
controlling for the respective sector of activity and year of application. Hence, while male and 
female borrowers may differ systematically due to any number of unobservable factors, 
identification of the gender effect will be robust as long as this difference is constant across 
male and female loan officers. 11
To formally gauge whether borrower assignment is random with respect to officer 
gender, we use two complementary tests. First, we verify if male relative to female borrowers 
vary in their characteristics depending on whether they are matched with an officer of their 
own or the opposite gender. If the identifying assumption is correct, there should be no 
statistically significant difference-in-differences observed between male and female 
borrowers ending up with a male or female officer. We utilize the following regression: 
 To address the possibility that it is not, we take two 
additional steps. First, we control for loan-officer fixed effects, allowing us to compare male 
and female borrowers independent of the specific (time-invariant) characteristics of a given 
loan officer (besides gender). Second, we also include a large number of observable contract-
related, borrower, bank branch, and (time-varying) loan officer characteristics. 
(1)    ,β µ φ ε= + + + + +ijts i j i j t s ijtsy gb gl gb gl  
where ijtsy  is one of the relevant characteristics of borrower i contracting with loan officer j in 
year t in sector s, gbi is a borrower-gender dummy taking the value 1 for female borrowers, glj 
is an officer-gender dummy taking the value 1 for male loan officers, tµ  is a year dummy, 
and sφ  is a sector dummy. The coefficient β  indicates whether there is a difference between 
male and female borrowers screened and monitored by male relative to female officers. The 
time fixed effects ( µ ) account for the fact that the gender composition is idiosyncratic only 
within each year while the sector fixed effects (φ ) control for any gender-specific business 
sector specialization. The assumption is that ( , ) 0=i jCov gb gl u z , where u  is any other 
determinant of the outcome of interest ijtsy  and z  is the vector of the relevant fixed effects. 
Specifically, we test for differences in socio-demographic borrower information (civil status, 
age), loan terms apart from the interest rate (applied loan size in USD, applied loan maturity 
                                                 
11 That is, we only require that the unobservable characteristics are the same in the two differences. As an 
indirect test of this assumption, we also show (Table 2) that the difference-in-differences in the observable traits 
are not significant. 
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in days, availability of a personal guarantee or of mortgage or chattel collateral), the loan 
usage (working capital, fixed assets, a combination of the two, housing improvement, 
consumption, and “other”), and information on the financial status of the borrower’s business 
(total assets in USD). We cluster the standard errors ε ijts  at the branch-sector-year level as 
borrowers in a given year, sector, and branch are likely to share background characteristics as 
well as be exposed to the same loan officer and environment. We present the results for the 
credit-demand sample in Table 2 and relegate the results for the loan-conditionality sample to 
the Appendix (Table A2). 
Table 2 shows that there are no systematic differences in the observable borrower 
characteristics in the opposite gender match of borrowers and loan officers. Specifically, 
columns (3) and (6) display the t-statistic of the relative difference across male and female 
borrowers for male and female officers, respectively. Finally, column (7) reports the t-statistic 
of the difference-in-differences estimate. While we find significant differences between male 
and female borrowers within the sub-groups of female and male loan officers, none of the 
differences in column (7) are significant. (The same holds true for Table A2.) 
In a second test, we regress loan officer gender on borrower gender to gauge whether 
there is systematic sorting of borrowers of a certain gender to loan officers of the same gender 
conditioning on time and on sector fixed effects. Specifically, we estimate 
(2)     ,µ φ ε= + + +j i t s ijtsgl gb  
where the variables are defined in an analogous manner to equation (1). The assumption is 
that ( , ) 0=j iCov gl gb z , where z is a vector of the relevant fixed effects. Table 3 documents 
the results of this regression for both the credit demand (Panel A) and the loan-conditionality 
sample (Panel B). 
The results in Table 3 show that conditional on time and on business sector, borrower 
gender cannot predict loan officer gender. In the first column, we estimate equation (2) 
without any fixed effects. In column (2) we add time dummies and in column (3) sector 
dummies. Panel A displays a statistically insignificant and small effect of borrower gender on 
loan officer gender across all three specifications. In Panel B, once we account for time fixed 
effects and sector specialization, borrower gender cannot explain loan officer gender. 






2.4 Main specification 
To investigate whether there is an own-gender bias in lending, we use OLS to estimate the 
following specification 
(3)  0 ,α β ρ µ φ η ε= + + + + + + + + + +ijts i j i j j t s b ijt i it ijtsO gb gl gb gl gb Xx  
where O is the outcome of interest (demand for a second loan, interest rate charged, loan 
amount approved, or arrear probability), , , ,ρ µ φ and η  are loan officer, time, sector, and 
branch fixed effects, respectively.12 β The coefficient  estimates the impact of opposite-sex 
officers on credit market outcomes (relative to own-gender officers). Put differently, it 
measures the differential effect of a female (male) borrower paired with a male (female) 
officer compared to a female (male) borrower matched with a female (male) officer. The 
parameter ijtx  is a vector that includes borrower traits (those of Table 2) and loan officer traits 
(age; number of loans processed with opposite-sex borrowers; number of arrears with 
opposite-sex borrowers). Though as discussed above, i jgb gl  is orthogonal to x  and the 
consistency of β  does not depend on the inclusion of the covariates. Besides the time and the 
sector dummies, the loan-officer fixed effects ( ρ ) control for any time-invariant loan-officer 
specific determinant of credit demand, loan conditionality, or arrear probability.13
η
 The branch 
fixed effects ( ) control for any time-invariant branch-level determinant of the relevant 
outcomes. 14 i itgb X Finally, we saturate the model by including an interaction ( ) between 
borrower gender and the vector of predetermined borrower characteristics as showed in Table 
2. This accounts for possible variation in borrower behavior between male and female 
borrowers depending on their socio-economic background and loan purpose. 
 
3 Own-gender bias and demand for credit 
 
3.1 Baseline findings 
We first examine the effect of gender identity on the likelihood that borrowers apply for a 
second loan with the lender. Table 4 presents the results of estimating equation (3) with a 
                                                 
12 The results are invariant to using a non-linear Probit model for the binary outcome variables. However, we 
lose the observations where the loan officers either have none of their borrowers return (or fall into arrears), or 
see all of their borrowers return (or all fall into arrears). 
13 Note that the loan officer dummy makes jgl  redundant. 




dummy equal to one if a borrower applied for more credit as the dependent variable. Column 
(1) includes loan officer, sector, and time-fixed effects, while columns (2) through (6) 
gradually add loan officer (time-variant) covariates [column (2)], borrower specific covariates 
[column (3)], branch fixed effects [column (4)], the interaction of borrower covariates with 
the female borrower dummy [column (5)], and the (potentially endogenous) loan 
characteristics (loan amount, maturity, and interest rate) [column (6)]. All of these variables 
are discussed above. We omit presenting results for the control variables to save space. 
The coefficients on i jgb gl  are similar across the six specifications, statistically 
significant, and show that loan officers’ and borrowers’ gender identity is a significant 
determinant of demand for credit. The main estimate, column (5), implies that borrowers 
matched with opposite-sex loan officers are 7.26 percentage points less likely to apply for a 
second loan with the same lender as compared to borrowers assigned to same-sex officers. 
The impact of the gender mismatch is economically significant given that 66 percent of all 
first-time borrowers apply for a second loan. It implies that the fraction of borrowers paired 
with an opposite-sex officer that do not return for a second loan is about 11 percent. For the 
remainder of the paper, we use the specification presented in column (5) that includes the full 
battery of fixed effects and all control variables, except for the loan characteristics. 
 
3.2 Loan officers’ opposite-gender experience and degree of discretion 
An important aim of the paper besides establishing the existence of a bias is to document how 
key determinants of loan officer behavior interact with their gender preferences. To do so, we 
explore the impact of gender-specific human capital traits by investigating loan officers’ prior 
exposure to opposite-sex borrowers. We also examine if loan officers’ degree of discretion to 
act on their gender beliefs is important. Studying officers’ previous experience with 
borrowers of the other gender allows us to test whether the gender bias is due to limited 
professional exposure to the opposite sex or if it is purely taste based. A better understanding 
of when loan officers find it in their interest to suppress their gender preferences tests if 
incentives matter. That is, do loan officers restrain their bias in situations where it potentially 
has negative consequences for their career prospective? 
We first investigate the impact of prior exposure to opposite-sex borrowers. As 
mentioned above, most loan officers are first-time employees that may adjust their behavior 
through learning on the job. To the extent that more exposure lessens the bias, this may be 
due to an initial knowledge gap about the other gender which decreases with experience, 
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allowing the loan officers to work more efficiently. Alternatively, they may have some initial 
taste bias that disappears as exposure creates “empathy” with the other gender which changes 
officers’ preferences. On the other hand, a pure taste-based bias, as captured by a greater 
preference for own-gender borrowers (relative to opposite-gender borrowers) will be 
unchanged with additional opposite-sex experience. 
Loan officer experience with opposite-sex borrowers is measured as the number of 
loans processed with first-time borrowers of the other gender. As these borrowers are matched 
arbitrarily across the officers, the number of interactions with the opposite sex is essentially 
random. We calculate the median of opposite-sex loan officer experience—nine interactions 
with the opposite sex—and split the credit-demand sample of 4,586 observations at this 
median.15
The results in Table 5 show that the gender bias affecting credit demand is driven by 
loan officers with little previous exposure to borrowers of the opposite sex. We find a 
significant and negative coefficient estimate on 
 The regression model is analogous to the one of column (5), Table 4, with the 
exception that we control for overall loan officer experience (interactions with all first-time 
and repeat borrowers) in some of the specifications. 
i jgb gl  in the case where bank officers have 
below-median experience with the opposite gender, while the coefficient in the above-median 
sample is positive, insignificant, and close to zero. The Wald test shows that the difference 
between the two estimates in each column pair is significant at the 5 percent level. Controlling 
flexibly for overall experience does not change the outcomes, suggesting that the effect we 
capture is distinct from more general competence. The treatment impact in column (1) implies 
a 25 percent (16.5 percentage points) decrease in the likelihood of demanding a second loan 
with the lender as compared to the overall mean of 66 percent, twice the size of the average 
effect estimated in Table 4. The median number of 9 processed loans with opposite-sex 
borrowers corresponds to a median of 387 days (or average of 460 days). Although this is a 
non-trivial time period, it suggests that the bias disappears relatively fast as loan officers gain 
additional professional experience with the opposite gender. 
Overall, the results provide support for a bias that fades away with gender-specific 
learning-on-the-job. The findings bear less credibility to the existence of pure prejudice 
governing the loan officers’ behavior and, ultimately, demand for a second loan by the 
borrowers. Next we turn to loan officers’ degree of discretion. 
                                                 
15 We ran the identification check of Table 2 for these two and all the other subsamples shown below. The tests 
show that our identifying assumption holds also for the subsamples. 
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Do loan officers act on a gender bias if it is potentially costly to do so? We examine 
this question by exploring how the effect of the opposite-gender match varies with situations 
that impact loan officers’ discretion. We use two proxies for the degree of discretion: 
competition from other financial institutions and the number of loan officers employed in a 
branch (branch size). A gender bias will be less costly in uncompetitive markets since 
borrowers have few outside options. As competition increases, however, a bias can be more 
damaging to credit demand, inducing the lender to scrutinize loan officers with greater care to 
detect mistreatment.16
To measure financial market competition we explore variation in the universe of 
formally registered bank branches across Albania’s 12 counties (prefekturë) over the years 
2004-2006. 
 Hence, less competition should increase loan officers’ discretion to act 
on their gender beliefs. Similarly, when there are few employees in a branch, a given loan 
officer may be more difficult to replace, giving him or her more discretion of indulging his or 
her preferences. 
17 We map this information with population records for each county and year and 
merge both statistics with our loan-level data. The final competition measure is defined as the 
number of bank branches per capita, by county and year. 18
                                                 
16 Although loan officer wage is independent of whether borrowers return to the bank for a second loan, branch 
managers are likely to intervene (at a cost to the responsible loan officer) if a bias leads to a drop in demand. 
 We then divide the sample 
according to whether the loan observations belong to regions with a branch-per capita ratio 
below (weak competition) or above (strong competition) the median ratio. In effect, we 
explore variation in competition across branches and years (allowing us to keep the branch 
dummies). The impact of branch size is identified in a similar manner. We exploit changes in 
the number of loan officers employed per branch and year yielding within-branch variation 
for the entire period 1996-2006. For each year, we divide the sample into bank branches 
above or below the median number of loan officers (our proxy for branch size). While these 
measures involve stronger assumptions than our earlier analysis, it is unlikely that the results 
are driven by reverse causality, where lower demand at the level of the individual officer-
borrower opposite-gender match leads to fewer branches locating in an area or to officers 
leaving a branch in a given year. We also provide further support to the claim that the effect 
on the likelihood of applying for a second loan is supply- as opposed to demand-driven by 
looking at alternative measures of borrowers’ financing options later in the text. 
17  We lack country-wide information on bank-branch establishments for the earlier years in our dataset. 
However, as most of the loan transactions take place in the latter period, the competition data still cover roughly 
75 percent of all processed loans. 
18 The results on competition are invariant to including the total number of financial institutions (banks) per 
county and year. 
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Table 6 shows that demand for credit is affected by the officer-borrower gender 
mismatch only when loan officers have a sufficient degree of discretion. In addition, loan 
officer discretion and lack of exposure to the opposite sex are complements. The negative 
impact on credit demand is most severe in situations when bank officers have little experience 
with borrowers of the other gender and few incentives to suppress their gender bias. 
Panel A reports the results on branch size and competition and shows that borrowers 
assigned to opposite-sex loan officers are less likely to apply for second loan in smaller 
branches and in counties with less financial market competition. The point estimate on branch 
size implies that the likelihood of applying for a second loan decreases by approximately 23 
percentage points or over 30 percent for a borrower that ends up with an opposite-sex loan 
officer in a smaller branch (the median number of loan officers per branch over the entire 
period is 13). The effect of competition is also sizable; an opposite-gender match induces a 25 
percent drop in demand in less competitive counties (the median number of branches per 
100,000 people is 7.3 for the years 2004-2006). Meanwhile, larger branches or more 
competitive areas yield slightly positive point estimates that are close to zero and significantly 
different from those of smaller branches and weak competition. 
In Panels B and C we investigate the relationship between loan officer discretion and 
prior opposite-sex exposure. Panel B shows that the coefficient on the i jgb gl  variable is 
significant (p<0.0001) only in smaller branches with loan officers that have little experience 
of opposite-gender borrowers, with an effect of 36 percentage points. In the case of larger 
branches and with loan officers with more opposite-sex experience, there is no significant 
effect of the officer-borrower gender match. In Panel C we find a similar pattern: demand for 
a second loan is reduced by 35 percentage points if the loan officer in less competitive 
counties also has little prior exposure to borrowers of the other gender. If competition is high 
or the loan officer has more opposite-sex exposure the effect is insignificant. The results for 
the combination of exposure and competition are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to 
those obtained for the branch size and the exposure distinction. In unreported robustness tests, 
we have included branch-year trends, which account for variation in overall demand for credit 
in any area or change in policy that differentially affects the allocation of employees or credit 
to a region over time. All of the point estimates in Table 6 remain essentially the same after 
this inclusion. 
To further corroborate that the effect on the likelihood of applying for additional credit 
is induced by supply-side constraints as opposed to being driven by an overall demand shock, 
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we explore variation in income at the branch and the city (qytet) level over time. The 
conjecture is that rural and poorer areas have fewer alternative financing options implying that 
loan officers have more discretion to act on their gender preferences. We use three different 
proxies to measure socio-economic status. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 split the sample according to whether the bank 
branches are rural or urban.19
Taken together, the results suggest that being assigned to an opposite-sex loan officer 
significantly reduces the likelihood that a first-time borrower applies for another loan. The 
effect is stronger when borrowers are matched to loan officers with little prior exposure to the 
opposite gender and when officers find it less costly to express their bias as proxied by 
changes in financial market competition, branch size, and level of income. Having established 
that demand for credit is affected by the gender pairing of loan officers and borrowers, we 
turn to some possible channels of influence. 
 As can be seen, the effect on the borrower-loan officer gender 
match is much larger in the predominantly rural bank branches, with a coefficient of 19 
percentage points. As this is a time-invariant measure, the impact is identified without branch 
fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) explore variation in the mean borrower asset size in a 
branch across branches and years (thus including bank branch dummies). The sample is 
divided at the median branch asset size in given year. We identify a strong gender bias in 
credit demand in branches with smaller mean asset sizes, with a point estimate of 15 
percentage points (p=0.007). The final two columns revisit the same question using earnings 
data at the city-year level from the World Bank’s LSMS household survey for the years 2002-
2005. We explore variation in the average monthly formal wage payment at the city and year 
level and divide the sample according to whether the loan observations belong to payments 
above or below the median in a given city-year pair. Again, the bias is more pronounced at 
the lower payment levels with a statistically significant point estimate that is almost identical 
to the coefficient produced when using the loan-level data measure derived at the branch and 
year level. As before, the findings are robust to the inclusion of branch-year trends. 
 
4 Loan conditionality 
The assignment of borrowers to opposite-sex loan officers may have hampered demand for 
credit through multiple channels. Bank officers interact with borrowers continuously over the 
                                                 
19 A branch is defined as rural if it is located in a city with less than 100,000 people. 
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lending relationship. A gender bias may have led to excessive monitoring or even harassment 
of borrowers of the opposite sex or, alternatively, too little attention paid to them when 
advising on project-related matters. It could also have affected the interpersonal relationship, 
making opposite-gender borrowers feel less comfortable with their respective loan officer. To 
the extent that these explanations have an impact on loan performance we will be able to 
assess whether the officer-borrower gender match affects the likelihood of going into arrears. 
Borrowers may also have adjusted their behavior depending on the gender of the loan officer, 
but it is not clear why this adjustment would have led to lower credit demand. If anything, 
borrowers would be motivated to lessen the effects of a potential bias making it more difficult 
to find any impact of a gender bias in the data. 
In this section, we explore one channel in detail; loan conditionality. Less attractive 
contract terms is an explicit measure of a gender bias that is easy to capture.20
 
 We examine 
two essential parts of the loan contract, interest paid and the loan amount borrowers receive. 
As an indirect measure of their effect on the demand for additional credit, we gauge whether 
opposite-sex experience and loan officer discretion remain important factors. 
4.1 Interest rates 
The results in Table 8 show that borrowers pay a significantly higher interest rate if matched 
to a loan officer of the opposite gender. To investigate the effect of the gender mismatch on 
annual interest paid we use the (larger) loan-conditionality sample. We replace the likelihood 
of applying for a second loan with the interest rate as the dependent variable and begin by 
studying the average impact. The results indicate that borrowers assigned to opposite-sex loan 
officers pay a higher price for credit compared to borrowers who end up with loan officers of 
the same gender. Table 8 shows that the point estimate on i jgb gl  is quite stable across the 
different specifications and significantly different from zero at the one percent level except for 
the first column. The coefficient in column (5) implies that a borrower pays, on average, 35 
basis points higher interest rates if matched with a loan officer of the opposite gender. This 
corresponds to an increase of about 2.5 percent overall (0.35 percentage points from the mean 
interest rate of 14 percent). The results hold up when we estimate the effects for the smaller 
credit-demand sample. If anything, the impact is slightly larger. 
                                                 
20 Gender-driven contract terms may, of course, also be an indication of the fact that other, less tangible, 
mistreatments are present. 
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Tables 9 and 10 investigate the effect of loan officers’ opposite-sex experience and 
degree of discretion. Overall the findings confirm our previous conclusions: little prior 
exposure to borrowers of the other gender and a larger degree of loan officer discretion 
increase the impact of the bias. Specifically, Table 9 shows that officers with a below-median 
experience of opposite gender borrowers charge interest rate that are 50 basis points or 3.6 
percent higher than those charged to same-sex borrowers. (The median is defined as in Table 
5.) Although the difference between the below- and the above-median exposure is not 
significant at conventional levels [p=0.1359 for column (1)], the interest rate differential for 
above-median exposure is never larger than 8 basis points in any of the regressions. 
Panel A of Table 10 revisits the impact of financial market competition and of branch 
size. The effects are qualitatively similar to those of demand for additional credit, that is, 
smaller branches and lower levels of competition yield higher interest rates, but the 
coefficients are never significantly different across small and large branches or across 
counties with weak and strong competition. Finally, Panels B and C of Table 10 show that the 
complementarity between loan officer experience and degree of discretion as found with 
credit demand also holds for the interest rate. Borrowers matched with loan officers of the 
opposite sex that have little previous exposure to the opposite gender and work in smaller 
branches pay 109 basis points or 7.8 percent higher interest rates (p<0.0001). Similarly, an 
opposite-sex loan officer with little experience of the other gender that works in a weakly 
competitive market charges opposite-sex borrowers interest rates that are 93 basis points 
higher. The other respective cases (high experience and large branches/strong competition) 
have insignificant point estimates that are statistically different at least at the ten percent level 
in all but once case from the low experience-smaller branch/weaker competition outcome. 
Finally, we explore a third proxy for the degree of discretion that loan officers can 
exercise: the age difference between officers and borrowers. The idea is as follows. Consistent 
with studies of cognitive behavior, there is a psychological cost involved in being biased that 
increases in cases where it is easier for the biased party to relate to the individual being biased 
against (Goodwin et al., 2000; Blair, 2002). For example, a male loan officer may have 
stereotype beliefs about women. However, if he interacts with a female borrower of similar 
age, he is more likely to identify with her and, hence, experience a higher cost coming from 
the bias. Meanwhile, mistreating someone of the opposite sex that is older (and, hence, quite 
different) could be associated with a smaller loss of utility. To sum up, loan officers’ degree 
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of discretion is larger when the psychological cost is lower, which occurs when the age 
difference between loan officers and borrowers increases. 
We implement this idea in Table 11 by dividing the sample according to the median 
loan officer age (24 years) and to the median borrower age (41 years). In addition, we split the 
sample according to the age difference, with the median difference being 16 years. 21
i jgb gl
 As 
predicted, the impact of the officer-borrower gender mismatch on interest rates is only 
significant among older borrowers [column (2)] and younger loan officers [column (3)]. 
Columns (5) and (6) bring the two measures together and quantify the age difference between 
loan officers and borrowers. When the age difference is above the median, the point estimate 
on  is 0.0055 (p=0.001). While the coefficient below the median age difference is 
almost 18 basis points, the difference between the two splits is significantly different at the 
ten percent level. The four last columns confirm that loan officer discretion as proxied by age 
difference and loan officer opposite-sex exposure are complements. Older borrowers assigned 
to younger opposite-sex loan officers with little exposure to the other gender pay 94 basis 
points higher interest. The point estimate is essentially identical to the one obtained when 




4.2 Approved loan amount 
Tables 12 and 13 report the effect of matching borrowers to opposite-sex loan officers on the 
loan amount they receive. As with the interest rate regressions, we use the loan-conditionality 
sample but now with loan amount as the dependent variable.23
                                                 
21 The results in Table 11 are invariant to excluding loan officers’ opposite-sex experience suggesting that the 
age results are not driven by experience per se. 
 Starting with Table 12, it 
shows that borrowers receive smaller loans if matched with loan officers of the other gender, 
though only significantly so for loan officers with little prior exposure to opposite-sex 
borrowers. On average, the officer-borrower gender mismatch leads to a loan that is 119 USD 
smaller (p=0.21). When investigating the effect for loan officers with less experience of the 
other gender [column (2)], the effect almost triples in size with a point estimate of -332 USD 
(p=0.07). This can be compared with the mean approved loan amount of 2,752 USD, 
indicating a 12 percent decrease. In the case of loans given by loan officers with above-
22 We have also examined if the age difference affects the officer-borrower gender match with respect to 
applying for a second loan and find qualitatively similar results. However, the difference between some of the 
point estimates fails to be significant at conventional levels. 
23 As in all of the previously reported regressions, Tables 12 and 13 control for the amount of credit applied for. 
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median exposure to the opposite gender, the coefficient enters positively and insignificantly in 
all three instances [columns (3), (5), and (7)]. The Wald tests further show that the point 
estimates are significantly different between the sample splits. 
Table 13 reports the findings with respect to loan officer discretion and prior exposure 
to borrowers of the other gender. In almost all cases, the results are qualitatively similar to 
those obtained when examining credit demand and interest rates. Borrowers allocated to 
opposite-sex loan officers obtain less funding in smaller branches and when competition is 
lower (panel A). The coefficient for smaller branch size is significant at the five percent level 
with a magnitude of -339 USD, whereas the effect for larger branches is positive, close to 
zero, and insignificant. The negative impact is also larger and significant in counties with less 
competition, -193 USD, but the difference across the median is not statistically significant 
(p=0.27). Panel B shows that low opposite-sex experience with the other gender and branch 
size are complements. The coefficient on i jgb gl  is negative and significant only in the sample 
of small branches with loan officers that are less experienced with the other gender. The 
estimate, -673 USD, is significant at the one percent level and implies a 24 percent decrease 
from the mean loan size of 2,752 USD. In larger branches or with loan officers that have more 
experience with opposite-gender borrowers, there is no significant impact and the coefficients 
are all statistically different from the column (1) estimate. Finally, the results in panel C 
indicate, as before, that officers with little experience of opposite-sex borrowers that work in 
counties with less competition are more likely to act on their gender bias by granting smaller 
loans, specifically, 439 USD less. However, we also detect a positive and significant effect for 
loan officers with more experience in competitive counties. We do not have a good 
explanation for this last result. 
Overall, first-time borrowers assigned to opposite-sex loan officers fare worse in terms 
of the price they pay for credit as well as the amount of credit the receive. In line with our 
earlier results for credit demand, we also find that loan officers’ prior experience with the 
other gender and their degree of discretion are complements: loan officers with little previous 
opposite-sex exposure and few incentives to suppress their bias offer borrowers of the other 
gender distinctly inferior loan terms. The consistent findings as to when the bias has stronger 
effects on the officer-borrower gender mismatch across applying for a second loan, interest 
rate, and loan amount suggest that the drop in demand for credit at least partly follows from 
the results on loan conditionality. However, we recognize that slightly higher interest rates 
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5 Is the gender bias efficient? 
The results so far point to a bias against borrowers of the other gender, a bias that decreases 
with exposure of loan officers to opposite-sex borrowers. Together these findings exclude the 
existence of pure prejudice. However, it is not clear whether the bias stems from a knowledge 
gap that leads loan officers to engage in more efficient transactions with own-gender 
borrowers at first or if it reflects an initial taste bias. In order for the bias to be efficient in the 
former sense, the officer-borrower gender mismatch should also have an impact on the 
likelihood of ending up in arrears. Specifically, the higher interest rate and lower loan amount 
may indicate a higher riskiness attached by loan officers to borrowers of the opposite sex, 
especially if the loan officer has limited experience with borrowers of the other gender. 
In this section we examine if loan officers initially have an information advantage 
with respect to borrowers of their own gender that is reflected in a lower level of ex-post risk 
as compared to borrowers of the opposite sex. We do this by exploring data on the likelihood 
that a loan is in arrears for more than 30 days. To allow for full loan cycles, we revert back to 
the credit-demand sample. All results reported in this section also go through with the larger 
loan-conditionality sample. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if a borrower has 
been in arrears more than 30 days during the duration of the contract. 
Tables 14 and 15 report our findings. Overall, there is no indication that borrowers of 
the same gender as their loan officer perform better in terms of a significantly lower 
likelihood of going into arrears. Column (1) of Table 14 shows that, on average, the arrear 
probability of loans screened and monitored by opposite-gender loan officers are not 
significantly different from the arrear probability of loans screened and monitored by own-
gender loan officers. If anything, opposite-sex borrowers are less likely to go into arrears. The 
variable on the officer-borrower gender mismatch is insignificant, with an effect of -1.5 
percentage points over the loan cycle. Dividing the sample by median opposite-sex 
experience [columns (2)-(7)], does not alter this conclusion. While the estimate on i jgb gl  
enters positively for the below-median sample, the coefficient is insignificant (p=0.84). For 
                                                 
24 In unreported robustness tests, we also explore whether there is a gender bias in other loan conditions, 
including the approved maturity. We do not see any impact of the officer-borrower gender match on average or 
across officer experience/discretion. 
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above-median opposite-gender experience, arrears are again lower, not higher, for borrowers 
of the other gender. 
Table 15 examines the impact of the officer-borrower gender interaction depending on 
branch size and financial market competition. We find a similar picture as in Table 14 when 
splitting the sample according to branch size [columns (1) and (2), panel A], with a positive 
(negative) gender-interaction estimate in the small (large) branch subsample. This also holds 
true when investigating competition. Panels B and C unpack the relation between officer-
borrower gender exposure and degree of discretion. Except for the pair of low exposure-weak 
competition where the gender interaction term enters significantly at the 10% level, there is 
little evidence for the conclusion that own-gender borrowers are less likely to go into arrears 
or, alternatively, that borrowers matched with opposite-sex loan officers are more likely to 
enter arrears during the life of their first loan. 
The results show that the significant gender bias found in the demand for a second 
loan or in terms of the loan contract, is absent in the arrear outcomes. One explanation for the 
lack of any discernible pattern may be that the potential monitoring advantage loan officers 
have when interacting with borrowers of the same gender boils down to avoiding larger 
shocks. To explore this possibility, we repeated all the regressions using the 60 day arrear 
measure. However, the results are similar to those reported above. (See Tables A3 and A4 in 
the Appendix for details.) Taken as a whole, this supports the existence of an initial taste-
based bias rather than the notion of an information hypothesis where loan officers are more 
efficient when transacting with own-gender as compared to opposite-gender borrowers. 
 
6 The source of the bias 
In our regression analysis, we rely on the quasi-random assignment of borrowers to loan 
officers controlling for sector and time fixed effects. While this ensures that our results are not 
driven by unobserved borrower characteristics correlated with the assignment of borrowers of 
one gender to loan officers of the other, it bars us from making inferences about the direction 
of the bias. That is, whether the bias is due to either male or female loan officers or both 
favoring borrowers of their own gender, or disfavoring those of the other gender. In this final 
section, we offer some suggestive evidence that the bias comes from both sides by 
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reanalyzing the average impact of i jgb gl  on interest rates and on the likelihood of applying 
for a second loan at the individual loan-officer level.25
For each loan officer, we regress the interest rate on a female borrower dummy for 
loan officers with at least 45 observations, controlling for time, sector, branch fixed effects, 
and loan officer and borrower characteristics.
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Figure 2 points to a qualitatively similar effect of the gender bias from both male and 
female loan officers on credit demand. Instead of using the interest rate, we explore the 
probability of returning for a second loan as the dependent variable. The median coefficient 
estimate is of similar economic magnitude across the genders: the female borrower dummy is 
–3.4 percent for male loan officers, whereas it is 3.4 percent for female loan officers. The 
interpretation is again that there is a pro-male bias among male loan officers and a pro-female 
bias among female loan officers leading borrowers of the opposite sex to exit at a greater 
degree. 
 Because these regressions are estimated 
separately for each loan officer, they control for loan officer specific differences in interest 
rate setting and propensity to monitor. Figure 1 plots the coefficient estimate for the female 
borrower dummy for each loan officer, with the bars representing the 95 percent confidence 
interval around the estimates. We find that the median interest rate differential for female (as 
opposed to male) borrowers is –18 basis points in the case of female loan officers and 20 
basis points in the case of male loan officers. While many of the coefficients are imprecisely 
estimated, quite a few yield point estimates that are statistically significantly different from 
zero. The reason for the somewhat smaller impact is that most of the loan officers in this 
sample have more experience of opposite-sex borrowers than the median officer. The figure 
indicates that the bias against the other gender is prevalent for loan officers of both genders. 
That is, the majority of male loan officers have a greater propensity to charge higher interest 
rates when lending to female borrowers than the majority of female loan officers. 
To sum up, figures 1 and 2 show that the evidence of a gender bias persists, even 
when the analysis is aggregated to the level of each loan officer, and indicate that loan officers 
predominately engage in an own-gender bias when transacting with their clients. 
 
                                                 
25 We confine our study to interest rates and credit demand as we have significant average effects in these two 
outcomes. 




Our results suggest that own-gender preferences affect credit market outcomes. First-time 
borrowers matched with opposite-sex loan officers in a large Albanian bank are 11 percent 
less likely to demand additional credit from the lender. The detected bias originates with 
borrowers whose loan officers have little prior exposure to borrowers of the other gender or 
whose loan officers have weak incentives to suppress their beliefs as proxied by financial 
market competition and branch size. These two factors are also complementary: the greatest 
impact of the officer-borrower match is found in instances when loan officers with little 
experience of the other gender are less scrutinized. 
The effects we identify are consistent with the explanation that opposite-sex borrowers 
receive inferior loan terms. To this end, we also show that borrowers assigned to loan officers 
of the other gender pay between 35 to 109 basis points higher interest rate and receive 
between 4 to 24 percent lower loan amounts, with the variation again depending on loan 
officers’ opposite-sex experience and degree of discretion. 
The own-gender bias does not seem to stem from pure prejudice nor is it consistent 
with loan officers initially treating borrowers of their own gender more efficiently, at least not 
as reflected in the level of ex-post risk as measured by the likelihood of entering into arrears. 
While our findings provide answers to where the bias should be stronger and why 
demand for credit decreases in the opposite-gender match it is, of course, possible that other 
channels are at work. In addition, we have detected a gender bias in a relatively poor country, 
Albania, where the level of gender discrimination is rather high, although women have made 
important strides into the labor market as shown by the high share of female loan officers 
employed by the lender. It is possible that the effect of a loan officer-borrower gender 
mismatch in a more developed setting would be different. 
Finally, our paper is the first to gauge the existence of an own-gender bias in lending 
and a better understanding of in-group identity, in the form of own-gender preferences, has at 
least two implications for the functioning of the credit market. First, identity should affect 
firms’ human-resource practices as loan officers’ opposite-gender experience has 
repercussions for the size of the bias. Second, from a policy perspective, our findings point to 
the possibility that financial market competition can be a powerful tool in dampening the 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the credit-demand  sample 
  Mean SD Median Male borrower Female borrower Male loan officer Female loan officer 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Likelihood of applying for a second loan 0.66 0.47 1.00 0.66 0.65 0.68 0.65 
Arrears > 30 days 0.05 0.22 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 
  
       
Female borrower 0.18 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.19 
Civil status (married = 1) 0.87 0.34 1.00 0.90 0.74 0.87 0.86 
Age applicant 40.87 10.10 40.94 40.75 41.44 40.86 40.88 
Total assets (in USD) 24,361 45,536 15,108 24,700 22,862 25,299 23,778 
Applied loan amount (in USD) 2,726 2,692 1,993 2,801 2,392 2,625 2,788 
Approved loan amount (in USD) 2,370 2,492 1,688 2,435 2,086 2,259 2,440 
Approved maturity (in days) 501 205 480 501 498 478 515 
Personal guarantee 0.23 0.42 0.00 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.24 
Mortgage guarantee 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.16 
Chattel guarantee 0.95 0.22 1.00 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.94 
Destination Working Capital 0.10 0.29 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.09 
Destination Fixed Assets 0.29 0.45 0.00 0.32 0.15 0.36 0.25 
Destination Housing Improvement 0.37 0.48 0.00 0.36 0.45 0.30 0.42 
Destination Consumption 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.21 0.35 0.22 0.25 
Destination Others 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Production 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.14 0.04 0.20 0.07 
Transport 0.15 0.35 0.00 0.17 0.04 0.16 0.14 
Construction 0.73 0.44 1.00 0.69 0.92 0.65 0.79 
  
       
Female loan officer 0.62 0.49 1.00 0.61 0.64 0.00 1.00 
Age loan officer 25.28 4.17 23.75 25.32 25.11 26.33 24.63 
Opposite sex experience 19.45 27.74 9.00 18.75 22.52 5.16 28.33 
Opposite sex arrear experience 1.16 2.30 0.00 1.11 1.39 0.29 1.71 
  
       
Branch size (number of loan officers) 15.51 9.01 13.00 15.23 16.74 16.28 15.03 
Branches per 100,000 inhabitants, county level 7.35 3.40 7.33 7.35 7.36 7.58 7.20 
Monthly wage payment, city level (in USD)  276 71 285 275 281 286 269 
        
Observations 4,589 
      This table reports descriptive statistics [mean, standard deviation (SD), median] for the credit demand sample. Columns (1)-(3) show the values for the entire sample, columns (4) and (5) the 
means for male and female borrowers, and columns (6) and (7) the means for male and female loan officers. 
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Table 2: Test for differences in borrower characteristics for the credit-demand sample 
  Male loan officers Female loan officers 
   Male borrowers Female borrowers t-statistic Male borrowers Female borrowers t-statistic t-statistic 
Variable (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2) (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5) (7) = (3) - (6) 
Age applicant 40.81 41.12 0.75 40.70 41.63 2.11** -0.41 
Civil status (married = 1) 0.90 0.76 -4.90*** 0.89 0.73 -10.04*** 1.53 
Applied loan amount (in USD) 2,686 2,336 -2.77*** 2,874 2,424 -3.18*** 0.56 
Applied maturity (in days) 533 514 -1.96* 562 563 -1.28 -1.31 
Total assets (in USD) 25,548 24,125 -1.70* 24,163 22,138 -3.01*** 0.30 
Personal guarantee 0.21 0.20 -0.33 0.24 0.24 -0.07 -0.25 
Mortgage collateral 0.11 0.10 -0.99 0.16 0.14 -1.99** 0.26 
Chattel collateral 0.96 0.95 0.32 0.94 0.93 -0.61 0.66 
Working Capital 0.12 0.08 0.60 0.10 0.04 -3.21*** 1.57 
Fixed Assets 0.40 0.18 -4.80*** 0.28 0.13 -4.03*** -1.37 
Housing Improvement 0.28 0.37 1.12 0.40 0.49 2.24 -0.96 
Consumption 0.20 0.36 4.34*** 0.23 0.34 3.14 0.96 
Others 0.00 0.00 n.a. 0.00 0.00 n.a. n.a. 
  
       Observations 1,451 308 1,759 2,292 538 2,830 4,589 
This table contains a test of difference in observable borrower characteristics for the credit-demand sample. Columns (1) and (2) show raw means for a set of borrower characteristics of male and 
female borrowers matched with male loan officers. Column (3) displays the t-statistic of a test of difference of the respective characteristic between male and female borrowers assigned to male 
loan officers. Columns (4) and (5) show raw means of male and female borrowers matched with female loan officers. Column (6) shows the t-statistic of a test of difference of the respective 
characteristic between male and female borrowers assigned to female loan officers. Column (7) reports the t-statistic of a test of difference-in-differences for the respective borrower 
characteristic. The t-statistics in columns (3), (6), and (7) are estimated conditioned on time and on sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the branch-sector-year level. ***, **, * 





Table 3: Test of random assignment 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: Credit-demand sample     
Borrower gender -0.0236 -0.0244 0.0101 
  [0.0301] [0.0278] [0.0188] 
  
   Time fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects No No Yes 
Observations 4,589 4,589 4,589 
  
   Panel B: Loan-conditionality sample     
Borrower gender -0.0979*** -0.0836** -0.0257 
  [0.0319] [0.0351] [0.0218] 
  
   Time fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Sector fixed effects No No Yes 
Observations 7,272 7,272 7,272 
This table reports the regression where loan officer gender is regressed on borrower gender. The dependent variable is a 
dummy that takes on value one if the loan officer is male. The main independent variable is a dummy that takes on value one 
if the borrower is female. Column (1) does not include any control variables. The column (2) regression adds time fixed 
effects and the column (3) regression further adds sector fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the branch-sector-year 





Table 4: Own-gender bias and the demand for a second loan 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
      Gender×Gender -0.0687** -0.0689** -0.0819** -0.0785** -0.0726** -0.0754** 
  [0.0330] [0.0330] [0.0320] [0.0316] [0.0360] [0.0360] 
  
      Adjusted R-squared 0.0600 0.0600 0.0790 0.0810 0.0840 0.0850 
Observations 4,589 4,589 4,586 4,586 4,586 4,586 
  
      Loan-officer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan officer covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower covariates No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Branch fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower gender×borrower 
covariates No No No No Yes Yes 
Loan characteristics No No No No No Yes 
This table reports regression results with the likelihood of returning for a second loan as the dependent variable using the 
credit-demand sample. Loan demand is a dummy variable that takes the value one if borrowers return to the bank for an 
additional loan application. Each regression also includes time and sector fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the 







Table 5: Demand for a second loan and loan officer experience with opposite-sex borrowers 
  Low experience High experience Low experience High experience Low experience High experience 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
      Gender×Gender -0.1649*** 0.0207 -0.1638*** 0.0197 -0.1666*** 0.0200 
  [0.0592] [0.0383] [0.0597] [0.0384] [0.0594] [0.0384] 
  





   
      Overall experience No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall experience, second-order polynomial No No No No Yes Yes 
  
      Adjusted R-squared 0.1020 0.0900 0.1030 0.0910 0.1050 0.0920 
Observations 2,247 2,339 2,247 2,339 2,247 2,339 
This table reports regression results with the likelihood of returning for a second loan as the dependent variable using the credit-demand sample. Loan demand is a dummy variable that takes the value 
one if borrowers return to the bank for an additional loan application. The sample is divided at the median first-time borrower opposite sex experience (median = 9 interactions with first-time 
borrowers of the opposite sex). All regressions include the control variables as specified in column (5) of Table 4 (including time and sector fixed effects), the results for these are omitted to save 
space. In columns (1) and (2), we do not control for any loan officer experience, in columns (3) and (4) we control for overall loan officer experience, and in columns (5) and (6) we control for a 




Table 6: Demand for a second loan, branch size, competition, and loan officer experience 
with opposite-sex borrowers 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Branch size and competition 
    Gender×Gender -0.2331*** 0.0207 -0.1720*** 0.0356 
  [0.0567] [0.0386] [0.0483] [0.0512] 
  
    P-value of Wald test 0.0001 
 
0.0018 
   
    Adjusted R-squared 0.0640 0.1110 0.0890 0.0850 
Observations 2,275 2,311 1,798 1,736 
  
    Panel B: Experience and branch size Low experience High experience 
  Small branches Large branches Small branches Large branches 
Gender×Gender -0.3627*** -0.0071 0.0575 0.0220 
  [0.0789] [0.0765] [0.0717] [0.0572] 
  
    P-value of Wald test 
 
0.0004 0.0001 0.0000 
  
    Adjusted R-squared 0.1070 0.1090 0.0630 0.1030 
Observations 1,196 1,051 1,079 1,260 
  










Gender×Gender -0.3451*** -0.0607 -0.0612 0.0894 
  [0.0843] [0.0923] [0.0748] [0.0979] 
  
    P-value of Wald test 
 
0.0070 0.0118 0.0002 
  
    Adjusted R-squared 0.1340 0.1090 0.0710 0.0680 
Observations 763 866 1,035 870 
This table reports regression results with the likelihood of returning for a second loan as the dependent variable using the 
credit-demand sample. Loan demand is a dummy variable that takes the value one if borrowers return to the bank for an 
additional loan application. All regressions include the control variables as specified in column (5) of Table 4 (including time 
and sector fixed effects), the results for these are omitted to save space. In columns (1) and (2) of Panel A we split the sample 
according to the median branch size, in columns (3) and (4) according to competition measured as the ratio of branches over 
population in a specific region and year for the time period 2004-2006. In Panels B and C, we further split the samples 
according to the median loan officer experience with the opposite sex. Standard errors clustered at the branch-sector-year 






Table 7: Demand for a second loan by socio-economic status 









  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
      Gender×Gender -0.1882*** -0.0404 -0.1539*** -0.0313 -0.1510** -0.0162 
  [0.0551] [0.0369] [0.0551] [0.0418] [0.0570] [0.0358] 
  







       Branch fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
      Adjusted R-squared 0.0670 0.0970 0.0770 0.1000 0.0920 0.0940 
Observations 1,863 2,723 2,309 2,277 1,879 1,872 
This table reports regression results with the likelihood of returning for a second loan as the dependent variable using the 
credit-demand sample. Loan demand is a dummy variable that takes the value one if borrowers return to the bank for an 
additional loan application. All regressions include the control variables as specified in column (5) of Table 4 (including time 
and sector fixed effects) except for columns (1) and (2) that exclude branch dummies, the results for the control variables are 
omitted to save space. In columns (1) and (2) we split the sample according to whether a branch is located in a rural or an 
urban area using the population of the respective cities the branches are located in. In columns (3) and (4) we split the sample 
according to the median asset size of the borrower’s business, measured over branch location and year. In columns (5) and (6) 
we split the sample according to areas in which the monthly payment was below or above the median, measured at the city 
and year level. Standard errors clustered at the branch-sector-year level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.  
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Table 8: Own-gender bias and interest rates 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
      Gender×Gender 0.0028** 0.0032*** 0.0032*** 0.0034*** 0.0035*** 0.0034*** 
  [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0013] [0.0013] 
  
      Adjusted R-squared 0.4330 0.4710 0.5470 0.5490 0.5510 0.5570 
Observations 7,272 7,272 7,266 7,266 7,266 7,266 
  
      Loan-officer fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Loan officer covariates No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower covariates No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Branch fixed effects No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Borrower gender×borrower 
covariates No No No No Yes Yes 
Loan characteristics No No No No No Yes 
This table shows regression results with the interest rate as the dependent variable using the loan-conditionality sample. Each 
regression includes time and sector fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at the branch-sector-year level are shown in 
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.  
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Table 9: Interest rate and loan officer experience with opposite-sex borrowers 
  Low experience High experience Low experience High experience Low experience High experience 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  
      Gender×Gender 0.0050** 0.0008 0.0050** 0.0006 0.0051** 0.0007 
  [0.0020] [0.0015] [0.0020] [0.0015] [0.0020] [0.0015] 
  





   
      Overall experience No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall experience, second-order polynomial No No No No Yes Yes 
  
      Adjusted R-squared 0.6470 0.5210 0.6470 0.5250 0.6470 0.5250 
Observations 3,678 3,588 3,678 3,588 3,678 3,588 
This table shows regression results with the interest rate as the dependent variable using the loan-conditionality sample. All regressions include the control variables as specified in column (5) of Table 4 
(including time and sector fixed effects), the results for these are omitted to save space. The sample is divided at the median first-time borrower opposite sex experience (median = 8 interactions with 
first-time borrowers of the opposite sex). In columns (1) and (2), we do not control for any loan officer experience, in columns (3) and (4) we control for overall loan officer experience, and in columns 
(5) and (6) we control for a second-order polynomial in overall loan officer experience. Standard errors clustered at the branch-sector-year level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance 
at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 10: Interest rate, branch size, competition, and loan officer experience with opposite-
sex borrowers 
  Small branches Large branches Weak competition Strong competition 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Branch size and competition       
Gender×Gender 0.0044** 0.0033* 0.0030* 0.0018 
  [0.0022] [0.0017] [0.0015] [0.0024] 
  
    P-value of Wald test 0.6768 
 
0.6563 
   
    Adjusted R-squared 0.6310 0.5020 0.5120 0.5430 
Observations 3,964 3,302 3,365 1,720 
  
    Panel B: Experience and branch size Low experience High experience 
  Small branches Large branches Small branches Large branches 
  
    Gender×Gender 0.0109*** 0.0018 -0.0018 0.0028 
  [0.0030] [0.0022] [0.0031] [0.0017] 
  
    P-value of Wald test 
 
0.0085 0.0030 0.0123 
  
    Adjusted R-squared 0.7020 0.6010 0.5790 0.4500 
Observations 2,320 1,356 1,644 1,946 
  











    Gender×Gender 0.0093*** 0.0033 -0.0011 0.0011 
  [0.0031] [0.0030] [0.0021] [0.0035] 
  
    P-value of Wald test 
 
0.1309 0.0138 0.0644 
  
    Adjusted R-squared 0.6210 0.6210 0.4780 0.5460 
Observations 1,526 879 1,839 841 
This table shows regression results with the interest rate as the dependent variable using the loan-conditionality sample. All 
regressions include the control variables as specified in column (5) of Table 4 (including time and sector fixed effects), the 
results for these are omitted to save space. In columns (1) and (2) of Panel A we split the sample according to the median 
branch size, in columns (3) and (4) according to competition measured as the ratio of branches over population in a specific 
region and year for the time period 2004-2006. In Panels B and C, we further split the samples according to the median loan 
officer experience with the opposite sex. Standard errors clustered at the branch-sector-year level are shown in parentheses. 




Table 11: Interest rate and officer-borrower age difference 
  Young Old Young Old Low age High age Low experience High experience 
  borrowers borrowers loan officers loan officers difference difference Low age diff High age diff Low age diff High age diff 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  
          Gender×Gender 0.0011 0.0050*** 0.0073*** 0.0003 0.0018 0.0055*** -0.0012 0.0094*** 0.0021 -0.0003 
  [0.0015] [0.0018] [0.0019] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0017] [0.0036] [0.0027] [0.0025] [0.0020] 
  






0.0067 0.0580 0.0003 
  
          Adjusted R-squared 0.5570 0.5550 0.5410 0.5940 0.5500 0.5650 0.6780 0.6580 0.4930 0.5210 
Observations 3,634 3,632 3,634 3,632 3,633 3,633 1,804 1,872 1,829 1,761 
This table shows regression results with interest rate as the dependent variable using the loan-conditionality sample. All regressions include the control variables as specified in column (5) of Table 4 
(including time and sector fixed effects), the results for these are omitted to save space. In columns (1) and (2), the sample is split according to the median borrower age (41 years). In columns (3) and 
(4), the sample is split according to the median loan officer age (24 years). In columns (5) and (6), the sample is split according to the median age difference between borrowers and loan officers (16 
years). In columns (7) through (10), the sample is further split according to loan officer experience with the opposite sex. Standard errors clustered at the branch-sector-year level are shown in 




Table 12: Approved loan amount and loan officer experience with opposite-sex borrowers 
  Average effect Low experience High experience Low experience High experience Low experience High experience 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
       Gender×Gender -118.9302 -332.4403* 207.2403 -336.3374* 207.0527 -342.9380* 214.7092 
  [94.8195] [176.9956] [182.3961] [177.7569] [181.8117] [176.8240] [182.3542] 
  







   
       Overall experience No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall experience, second-order polynomial No No No No No Yes Yes 
  
       Adjusted R-squared 0.6510 0.6920 0.6350 0.6920 0.6350 0.6920 0.6350 
Observations 7,266 3,678 3,588 3,678 3,588 3,678 3,588 
This table shows regression results with the approved loan amount in USD as the dependent variable using the loan-conditionality sample.. All regressions include the control variables as specified in 
column (5) of Table 4 (including time and sector fixed effects), the results for these are omitted to save space. The sample is divided at the median first-time borrower opposite sex experience (median = 
8 interactions with first-time borrowers of the opposite sex). In column (1) we show the average effect on loan amount, in columns (2) to (7) we split the sample according to median loan officer 
experience with the opposite sex. In columns (2) and (3), we do not control for any loan officer experience, in columns (4) and (5) we control for overall loan officer experience, and in columns (6) and 
(7) we control for a second-order polynomial in overall loan officer experience. Standard errors clustered at the branch-sector-year level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 13: Approved loan amount, branch size, competition, and loan officer experience with 
opposite-sex borrowers 
  Small branches Large branches Weak competition Strong competition 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Branch size and competition       
Gender×Gender -338.7150** 10.3515 -192.5165* 64.4844 
  [147.2241] [138.4870] [112.1763] [215.5900] 
  
    P-value of Wald test 0.0725 
 
0.2665 
   
    Adjusted R-squared 0.6310 0.5020 0.5120 0.5430 
Observations 3,964 3,302 3,365 1,720 
  
    Panel B: Experience and branch size Low experience High experience 
  Small branches Large branches Small branches Large branches 
  
    
Gender×Gender -673.4192*** 64.1529 162.5735 200.314 
  [245.7182] [296.4278] [213.6640] [150.5055] 
  
    P-value of Wald test 
 
0.0395 0.0050 0.0014 
  
    Adjusted R-squared 0.7020 0.7120 0.7100 0.6070 
Observations 2,320 1,356 1,644 1,946 
  











    
Gender×Gender -438.5765* -42.6934 30.2655 449.5977** 
  [255.7874] [332.1583] [83.9955] [196.0232] 
  
    P-value of Wald test 
 
0.3053 0.0685 0.0034 
  
    Adjusted R-squared 0.7230 0.7590 0.7900 0.7020 
Observations 1,526 879 1,839 841 
This table shows regression results with the approved loan amount in USD as the dependent variable using the loan-
conditionality sample.. All regressions include the control variables as specified in column (5) of Table 4 (including time and 
sector fixed effects), the results for these are omitted to save space. In columns (1) and (2) of Panel A, we split the sample 
according to the median branch size, in columns (3) and (4) according to competition measured as the ratio of branches over 
population in a specific region and year for the time period 2004-2006. In Panels B and C, we further split the samples 
according to the median loan officer experience with the opposite sex. Standard errors clustered at the branch-sector-year 




Table 14: Arrears > 30 days and loan officer experience with opposite-sex borrowers 
  Average effect Low experience High experience Low experience High experience Low experience High experience 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
       Gender×Gender -0.0152 0.0176 -0.0502* 0.0170 -0.0503* 0.0173 -0.0505* 
  [0.0171] [0.0250] [0.0287] [0.0252] [0.0288] [0.0249] [0.0292] 
  







   
       Overall experience No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall experience, second-order polynomial No No No No No Yes Yes 
  
       Adjusted R-squared 0.1090 0.1280 0.0580 0.1290 0.0580 0.1290 0.0590 
Observations 4,586 2,246 2,340 2,246 2,340 2,246 2,340 
This table shows regression results with the measure arrears > 30 days as the dependent variable using the credit-demand sample. Arrears > 30 days is a dummy variable that takes on value one if a 
borrower went into arrears for more than 30 days at any time during the lifetime of her loan. All regressions include the control variables as specified in column (5) of Table 4 (including time and sector 
fixed effects), the results for these are omitted to save space.. In column (1) we show the average effect on arrears > 30 days, in columns (2) to (7) we split the sample according to median loan officer 
experience with the opposite sex. In columns (2) and (3), we do not control for any loan officer experience, in columns (4) and (5) we control for overall loan officer experience, and in columns (6) and 
(7) we control for a second-order polynomial in overall loan officer experience. Standard errors clustered at the branch-sector-year level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 




Table 15: Arrears > 30 days, branch size, competition, and loan officer experience with 
opposite-sex borrowers 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Branch size and competition       
Gender×Gender 0.0137 -0.0386 0.0249 -0.0321 
  [0.0212] [0.0244] [0.0197] [0.0299] 
  
    P-value of Wald test 0.0894 
 
0.0928 
   
    Adjusted R-squared 0.0800 0.1120 0.1170 0.0890 
Observations 2,275 2,311 1,798 1,736 
  
    Panel B: Experience and branch 
size Low experience High experience 
  Small branches Large branches Small branches Large branches 
  
    
Gender×Gender 0.0194 0.0178 0.0496*** -0.1075*** 
  [0.0466] [0.0376] [0.0176] [0.0167] 
  
    P-value of Wald test 
 
0.9773 0.5367 0.0060 
  
    Adjusted R-squared 0.0950 0.1340 0.0130 0.0680 
Observations 1,196 1,050 1,079 1,261 
  
    Panel C: Experience and 











    
Gender×Gender 0.0568* 0.0382 0.0188 -0.1040*** 
  [0.0304] [0.0433] [0.0414] [0.0207] 
  
    P-value of Wald test 
 
0.7260 0.4309 0.0000 
  
    Adjusted R-squared 0.1480 0.1150 0.0610 0.0360 
Observations 763 865 1,035 871 
This table shows regression results with the measure arrears > 30 days as the dependent variable using the credit-demand 
sample. Arrears > 30 days is a dummy variable that takes on value one if a borrower went into arrears for more than 30 days 
at any time during the lifetime of her loan. All regressions include the control variables as specified in column (5) of Table 4 
(including time and sector fixed effects), the results for these are omitted to save space. In columns (1) and (2) of Panel A, we 
split the sample according to the median branch size, in columns (3) and (4) according to competition measured as the ratio of 
branches over population in a specific region and year for the time period 2004-2006. In Panels B and C, we further split the 
samples according to the median loan officer experience with the opposite sex. Standard errors clustered at the branch-sector-
year level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Appendix Table A1: Descriptive statistics for the loan-conditionality sample 
  Mean SD Median Male borrower Female borrower Male Loan officer Female Loan officer 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Interest rate 0.14 0.03 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
Approved loan amount (in USD) 2,752 2,880 1,966 2,811 2,468 2,700 2,789 
  
       
Female borrower 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.14 0.19 
Civil status (married = 1) 0.87 0.34 1.00 0.90 0.74 0.89 0.86 
Age applicant 41.08 10.25 41.07 40.97 41.64 41.19 41.00 
Total assets (in USD) 27,790 85,099 17,028 27,974 26,897 27,495 28,001 
Applied loan amount (in USD) 3,078 2,986 2,116 3,143 2,760 3,024 3,116 
Approved maturity (in days) 566 294 540 567 562 544 581 
Personal guarantee 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.20 
Mortgage guarantee 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.14 
Chattel guarantee 0.96 0.20 1.00 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.95 
Destination Working Capital 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.07 
Destination Fixed Assets 0.36 0.48 0.00 0.40 0.18 0.52 0.25 
Destination Housing Improvement 0.33 0.47 0.00 0.31 0.42 0.21 0.41 
Destination Consumption 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.20 0.34 0.15 0.27 
Destination Others 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Production 0.16 0.37 0.00 0.19 0.06 0.29 0.07 
Transport 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.16 0.13 
Construction 0.69 0.46 1.00 0.65 0.90 0.55 0.80 
  
       
Female loan officer 0.58 0.49 1.00 0.57 0.66 0.00 1.00 
Age loan officer 25.38 4.33 23.79 25.44 25.10 26.53 24.56 
Opposite sex experience 24.51 37.62 8.00 22.95 32.06 4.39 38.87 
Opposite sex arrear experience 1.63 3.23 0.00 1.49 2.31 0.30 2.58 
  
       
Branch size (number of loan officers) 14.15 8.53 12.00 13.79 15.86 13.50 14.61 
Number of branches per 100,000 inhabitants, county level 5.75 2.69 5.47 5.76 5.74 5.90 5.63 
  
       
Observations 7,272 
      This table reports descriptive statistics [mean, standard deviation (SD), median] for the loan-conditionality sample. Columns (1)-(3) show the values for the entire sample, columns (4) and (5) the means 




Appendix Table A2: Test for differences in borrower characteristics for the loan-conditionality sample 
  Male loan officers Female loan officers 
   Male borrowers Female borrowers t-statistic Male borrowers Female borrowers t-statistic t-statistic 
Variable (1) (2) (3) = (1) - (2) (4) (5) (6) = (4) - (5) (7) = (3) - (6) 
Age applicant 41.09 41.86 1.97* 40.88 41.52 1.94* 0.49 
Civil status (married = 1) 0.90 0.77 -5.78*** 0.89 0.73 -11.17*** 1.53 
Applied loan amount (in USD) 3,065 2,764 -2.69*** 3,202 2,758 -2.88*** 0.34 
Applied maturity (in days) 589 582 -1.01 626 614 -1.89* -0.42 
Total assets (in USD) 27,259 28,978 0.01 28,521 25,842 -1.65 1.55 
Personal guarantee 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.18 -0.57 0.34 
Mortgage collateral 0.09 0.11 -0.93 0.15 0.13 -2.01** 0.23 
Chattel collateral 0.97 0.96 -0.10 0.95 0.94 -0.71 0.42 
Working Capital 0.12 0.09 0.50 0.08 0.04 -3.21*** 1.58 
Fixed Assets 0.56 0.30 -6.67*** 0.28 0.13 -4.65*** -1.02 
Housing Improvement 0.19 0.32 1.83* 0.40 0.47 2.13** -0.83 
Consumption 0.13 0.29 4.61*** 0.25 0.36 4.06*** 0.72 
Others 0.00 0.00 n.a. 0.00 0.00 1.16 -1.08 
  
       Observations 2,613 417 3,030 3,416 826 4,242 7,272 
This table contains a test of difference in observable borrower characteristics for the loan-conditionality sample. Columns (1) and (2) show raw means for a set of borrower characteristics of male and 
female borrowers matched with male loan officers. Column (3) displays the t-statistic of a test of difference of the respective characteristic between male and female borrowers assigned to male loan 
officers. Columns (4) and (5) show raw means of male and female borrowers matched with female loan officers. Column (6) shows the t-statistic of a test of difference of the respective characteristic 
between male and female borrowers assigned to female loan officers. Column (7) reports the t-statistic of a test of difference-in-differences for the respective borrower characteristic. The t-statistics in 
columns (3), (6), and (7) are estimated conditioned on time and on sector fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the branch-sector-year level. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 




Appendix Table A3: Arrears > 60 days and loan officer experience with opposite-sex borrowers 
  Average effect Low experience High experience Low experience High experience Low experience High experience 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
       Gender×Gender 0.0019 0.0167 -0.0221 0.0166 -0.0222 0.0176 -0.0223 
  [0.0109] [0.0219] [0.0139] [0.0220] [0.0139] [0.0216] [0.0138] 
  







   
       Overall experience control No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Overall experience squared control No No No No No Yes Yes 
  
       Adjusted R-squared 0.0970 0.1180 0.0520 0.1180 0.0520 0.1190 0.0520 
Observations 4,586 2,247 2,339 2,247 2,339 2,247 2,339 
This table shows regression results with the measure arrears > 60 days as the dependent variable using the credit-demand sample. Arrears > 60 days is a dummy variable that takes on value one if a 
borrower went into arrears for more than 60 days at any time during the lifetime of her loan. All regressions include the control variables as specified in column (5) of Table 4 (including time and sector 
fixed effects), the results for these are omitted to save space. In column (1) we show the average effect on arrears > 60 days, in columns (2) to (7) we split the sample according to median loan officer 
experience with the opposite sex. In columns (2) and (3), we do not control for any loan officer experience, in columns (4) and (5) we control for overall loan officer experience, and in columns (6) and 
(7) we control for a second-order polynomial in overall loan officer experience. Standard errors clustered at the branch-sector-year level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 




Appendix Table A4: Arrears > 60 days, branch size, competition, and loan officer experience 
with opposite-sex borrowers 





  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Panel A: Branch size and competition       
Gender×Gender -0.0007 -0.0025 0.0051 0.0060 
  [0.0123] [0.0181] [0.0157] [0.0193] 
  
    P-value of Wald test 0.9299 
 
0.9676 
   
    Adjusted R-squared 0.0800 0.0980 0.1150 0.0740 
Observations 2,275 2,311 1,798 1,736 
  
    Panel B: Experience and branch size Low experience High experience 
  Small branches Large branches Small branches Large branches 
  
    Gender×Gender 0.0027 0.0239 0.0089 -0.0378** 
  [0.0363] [0.0349] [0.0062] [0.0177] 
  
    P-value of Wald test 
 
0.6486 0.8578 0.2818 
  
    Adjusted R-squared 0.1020 0.1110 0.0070 0.0700 
Observations 1,196 1,051 1,079 1,260 
  











    Gender×Gender 0.0303 0.0369 -0.0155 -0.0384** 
  [0.0244] [0.0352] [0.0250] [0.0187] 
  
    P-value of Wald test 
 
0.8663 0.0684 0.0050 
  
    Adjusted R-squared 0.2230 0.0800 0.0020 0.0330 
Observations 763 866 1,035 870 
This table shows regression results with the measure arrears > 60 days as the dependent variable using the credit-demand 
sample. Arrears > 60 days is a dummy variable that takes on value one if a borrower went into arrears for more than 60 days 
at any time during the lifetime of her loan. All regressions include the control variables as specified in column (5) of Table 4 
(including time and sector fixed effects), the results for these are omitted to save space. In columns (1) and (2) of Panel A, we 
split the sample according to the median branch size, in columns (3) and (4) according to competition measured as the ratio of 
branches over population in a specific region and year for the time period 2004-2006. In Panels B and C, we further split the 
samples according to the median loan officer experience with the opposite sex. Standard errors clustered at the branch-sector-
year level are shown in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
